Michu+Madera

Michu, Pretend that you are US president Eisenhower and answer 5 of the six points that Anthony Eden made in his letter to him. Be factual. Thanks. DV

** (1) We are all agreed that we cannot afford to allow Nasser to seize control of the Canal in this way, in defiance of international agreements. If we take a firm stand over this now, we shall have the support of all the maritime Powers. If we do not, our influence and yours **** throughout **** the Middle East will, we are convinced, be finally destroyed. **  (Eisenhower president) I think the same, it is important that Nasser do not have control over the Suez Canal as he wants. Also I am conscious that we have the maritime Powers support, so I think the best way to not allow Nasser to do what he wants is to take a firm now. I don’t want our influences to be destroyed so we must start with the firms. (Eisenhower president) I have no problem helping you, but I would prefer the Canal remain opened, so you can use the normal quantity of oil you always use. Also the Canal is one of the biggest Middle East vital economies so if it closes the economy of these countries would go down! (Eisenhower president) I agree with you, Egypt is not capable to control the Suez Canal in the best way. Egypt wants to exploit it; and that can create a lot of problems in the countries’ economies that uses the canal. Egypt desires are   selfish, they want to satisfy their own needs, but they ignore the needs of the Canal users. Egypt can’t manage the Canal according the Canal’s International obligations, they can’t manage the Canal capital and the traffic it will soon have.  (Eisenhower president) I don’t agree with you in this point. I think it is our obligation to get involved in the legal issues within the Egypt state, but I agree with you in the point that we should take issue with Nasser on the boarder international grounds. It is important that we maintain informed so we can know what we are talking about, without secrets and tramps. (Eisenhower president) I think that your idea is very interesting, but be carefully. Well I would not like to hear that your plan of bringing Nasser to his senses finished in a massacre. I think Egypt is not due to receive more aid from me too, but I think that you must not try to convince him using a force method. Talking and arriving in a just treat is better. (Eisenhower president) I think that this is the best option. I will be talking with France and concerning how we can bear Egyptian government in the best way. I think that the best way to convince them is blackmailing them with the help they are soliciting from USA.
 * (2) The immediate threat is to the oil supplies to Western Europe, a great part of which flows through the Canal. We have reserves in the United Kingdom which would last us for six weeks; and the countries of Western Europe have stocks, rather smaller as we believe, on which they could draw for a time. We are, however, at once considering means of limiting current consumption so as to conserve our supplies. If the Canal were closed we should have to ask you to help us by reducing the amount which you draw from the pipeline terminals in the Eastern Mediterranean and possibly by sending us supplementary supplies for a time from your side of the world. **
 * (3) It is, however, the outlook for the longer term which is more threatening. The Canal is an international asset and facility, which is vital to the free world. The maritime Powers cannot afford to allow Egypt to expropriate it and to exploit it by using the revenues for her own internal purposes irrespective of the interests of the Canal and of the Canal users. Apart from the Egyptians' complete lack of technical qualifications, their past behavior gives no confidence that they can be trusted to manage it with any sense of international obligation. Nor are they capable of providing the capital which will soon be needed to widen and deepen it so that it may be capable of handling the increased volume of traffic which it must carry in the years to come. We should, I am convinced, take this opportunity to put its management on a firm and lasting basis as an international trust **
 * (4) We should not allow ourselves to become involved in legal quibbles about the rights of the Egyptian Government to nationalize what is technically an Egyptian company, or in financial arguments about their capacity to pay the compensation which they have offered. I feel sure that we should take issue with Nasser on the broader international grounds summarized in the preceding paragraph. **
 * (5) As we see it we are unlikely to attain our objective by economic pressures alone. I gather that Egypt is not due to receive any further aid from you. No large payments from her sterling balances here are due before January. We ought in the first instance to bring the maximum political pressure to bear on Egypt. For this apart from our own action, we should invoke the support of all the interested Powers. My colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, in the last resort to use force to bring Nasser to his senses. For our part we are prepared to do so. I have this morning instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military plan accordingly. **
 * (6) However, the first step must be for you and us and France to exchange views, align our policies and concert together how we can best bring the maximum pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government. **